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The goal of the study was to investigate the relationship between domain-general working
memory capacity and domain-speciﬁc creativity amongst experienced soccer players.We
administered the automated operation span task in combination with a domain-speciﬁc
soccer creativity task to a group of 61 experienced soccer players to address the
question whether an athlete’s domain-speciﬁc creativity is restricted by their domain-
general cognitive abilities (i.e., workingmemory capacity). Given that previous studies have
either found a positive correlation, a negative correlation, or no correlation betweenworking
memory capacity and creativity, we analyzed the data in an exploratorymanner by following
recent recommendations to report effect-size estimations and their precision in form of
95% conﬁdence intervals. The pattern of results provided evidence that domain-general
working memory capacity is not associated with creativity in a soccer-speciﬁc creativity
task. This pattern of results suggests that future research and theorizing on the role of
working memory in everyday creative performance needs to distinguish between different
types of creative performance while also taking the role of domain-speciﬁc experience into
account.
Keywords: working memory, creativity, soccer, experience, divergent thinking, convergent thinking
INTRODUCTION
The slogan of one of the most famous and successful companies
in the world, Apple, is “think different.” It is not unusual that
Apple’s astonishing success is attributed to the business’ policy of
encouraging creativity or “thinking different,” enabling them to
come up with new ways of outsmarting their competitors and
opponents. Given the importance that is attributed to creativity
in, for example, outsmarting one’s competitors and opponents it
is not surprising that creativity has received a great deal of research
attention. Recently, researchers have attempted to shed light on the
underlying cognitivemechanisms associatedwith creative thought
and behavior. In this endeavor, a recent line of research has begun
to investigate the relationship between the central cognitive con-
cept of working memory and creativity. However, the ﬁndings
emerging from this line of research have been highly ambiguous,
calling for further research on this topic.
Creativity can broadly be deﬁned as the generation of ideas or
problem solutions that are novel but still appropriate (Amabile,
1983; Sternberg and Lubart, 1999). Oftentimes the multifaceted
term creativity is equated with the concept of divergent thinking
(Guilford, 1967) in the cognitive literature which can be deﬁned
as the cognitive processes generating a broad range of solutions to
a given problem (Runco, 2007). Divergent thinking is often con-
trasted with convergent thinking, which is deﬁned as a deductive
process that applies rules to arrive at a single, optimal solution.
Besides being reported as an antithesis of divergent thinking (e.g.,
Guilford, 1967), convergent thinking has also been regarded as a
complementary creativity process (e.g., Brophy, 2000; Dietrich,
2004; Runco, 2007). Divergent thinking is assumed to initially
generate a broad range of solutions while convergent thinking dis-
cerns which solutions are the most appropriate in order to settle
for the highest quality solution.
Divergent thinking has been suggested to include the cognitive
measures of ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and originality (Guilford, 1967).
Fluency refers to the ability to generate many responses; ﬂexi-
bility as the ability to switch categories between responses; and
originality as the ability to generate seldom responses accord-
ing to the norm. In order to gain a better understanding of the
cognitive underpinnings of creativity, modern creativity research
(e.g., Lee and Therriault, 2013) is (re-)examining the relation-
ship between convergent and divergent thinking and higher-order
cognition (e.g., executive functions, working memory). Building
on research highlighting the importance of intelligence in cre-
ative thinking (Sternberg et al., 2005; Runco, 2007), more recent
endeavors have started to explore the role of working memory in
creativity.
Working memory can be deﬁned as the cognitive mechanisms
capable of retaining a small amount of information in an active
state for use in ongoing tasks (for reviews, see Miyake and Shah,
1999; Baddeley, 2007; Conway et al., 2007). The most important
advance of the working memory model was the proposal of a sys-
temnot only responsible for the storage of information but also for
mechanisms of cognitive control and attention—named the cen-
tral executive (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2003). Since
then, working memory has been referred to as the “blackboard of
the mind” (Goldman-Rakic, 1992). It can be considered as one of
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the most signiﬁcant achievements in human evolution as it allows
to string together existing knowledge with current thoughts and
ideas. According to this conceptualization, working memory intu-
itively seems to be an important cognitive component supporting
creativity. However, the empirical evidence for this suggestion is
not as clear cut as one might assume based on Goldman-Rakic
(1992).
Given that two of the most important functions ascribed to
working memory—keep novel information in a heightened state
of activity and to discriminate between irrelevant and relevant
information (Unsworth and Engle, 2007)—are also assumed to
be highly relevant in creativity (De Dreu et al., 2012), it seems
reasonable to assume that superior working memory functioning
is associated with enhanced creativity. This positive association
between measures of working memory capacity and creativity has
received some empirical support.
For example, Süss et al. (2002) and Oberauer et al. (2008)
demonstrated that working memory capacity was positively
related to a series of different creativity tasks, involving the gen-
eration of three-word sentences, or the creation of objects out of
a ﬁxed number of elements following certain generation rules. In
addition, De Dreu et al. (2012) showed that people performed
worse on a creative insight task when their working memory
capacity was taxed by a secondary task and that high working
memory individuals showed more creative performance on diver-
gent thinking tasks even when intelligence was controlled for.
Further, they provided preliminary (as there was only an effect
of working memory capacity on creative improvisations when
artiﬁcially creating a creativity score over time) evidence that
semiprofessional cellists performed more creative improvisations
when scoring high on working memory capacity compared to cel-
lists scoring low on working memory. Evidence along these lines
was also provided by Lee and Therriault (2013) who concluded
that working memory plays an important role in creative think-
ing because high working memory individuals are more likely to
overcome interference caused by automatic, unoriginal responses,
or stated differently, because high working memory individuals
are better able at breaking away from a mental set or ineffective
approach to a problem (see also Gilhooly et al., 2007 for a similar
argumentation).
However, an increasing number of studies have also reported an
opposite, negative relationship between working memory capac-
ity and creativity (see Wiley and Jarosz, 2012, for a review).
This line of research has made the argument that an important
feat of working memory is to “zoom” in the focus of atten-
tion on the problem at hand, avoid distraction, and narrow
the search in the problem space, and thereby, in turn, harm-
ing creative thought. Studies providing evidence that a deﬁcit in
attentional control (as measured by working memory capacity
tasks, Engle, 2002, for a review) is beneﬁcial for creative prob-
lem solving, for example, have shown that alcohol intoxication,
leads to signiﬁcant deﬁcits in working memory capacity which in
turn improves creative problem solving. The association between
a lack of attentional control, working memory, and creativity is
further supported by studies showing more creative performance
amongst hyperactive children, who are characterized by work-
ing memory impairments and a decreased ability to focus their
attention (Shaw, 1992; Fugate et al., 2013). Fugate et al. (2013)
suggested that even amongst gifted (high IQ) children with an
attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) the relationship
between working memory and a creativity index was negative,
accounting for 12% of variance. Similarly, the administration
of Ritalin (methylphenidate) signiﬁcantly decreased symptoms
of ADHD but also decreased creativity (Swartwood et al., 2003),
while improving working memory capacity (Mehta et al., 2004).
Evidence from brain imaging studies (Takeuchi et al., 2011) sup-
ports the line of argumentation that diffuse attention is related to
individual creativity by showing that divergent thinking is posi-
tively associated with the inefﬁcient reallocation of attention in
the brain.
Given these opposing ﬁndings on the relationship between
working memory and creativity, it is not surprising that other
studies have failed to ﬁnd any direct correlation between work-
ing memory and creativity (e.g., Takeuchi et al., 2011; Lee
and Therriault, 2013). Taken together, these ambiguous ﬁnd-
ings suggest that important moderating variables inﬂuence the
relationship between creative performance and working mem-
ory and have to be taken into account when investigating this
relationship.
One moderating variable that has been identiﬁed to play an
important role in the relationship between working memory and
creativity is the type of creativity task used (Lin and Lien, 2013).
With reference to dual-process theories (Evans and Stanovich,
2013, for a recent review), Lin and Lien (2013) suggested that
the generation of numerous solutions, as is required in diver-
gent thinking tasks, is more dependent on effortless, associative
Type 1 processing (Evans and Stanovich, 2013) and therefore
does not heavily load on working memory. According to Evans
and Stanovich (2013) Type 1 processing is deﬁned by being both
initiated and completed in thepresenceof relevant triggering inter-
nal or external conditions. This type of processing is assumed
to not require working memory. On the other hand, conver-
gent processing as is required, for example, in creative insight
tasks necessitates a more rule-based—Type 2 processing—and
therefore requires working memory. Type 2 processing is usu-
ally deﬁned as a controlled, rule-based type of processing that
requires working memory for hypothetical thinking and mental
simulation (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). In a series of experi-
ments, Lin and Lien (2013) provide preliminary evidence for this
suggestion.
In addition, research on the relationship between working
memory and creativity in everyday settings is further compli-
cated by the role of domain-speciﬁc knowledge in the creativ-
ity task (Wiley, 1998). In this respect, it has been suggested
that expertise in a given domain facilitates problem solving by
restricting attention to the most obvious solutions to the prob-
lem and suppressing less obvious options. Therefore, expertise
can actually hinder creative performance in certain situations
and domains by “not thinking outside the box” (Wiley and
Jarosz, 2012, for a review). In an important study, partici-
pants with high levels of domain-speciﬁc knowledge and high
working memory capacity were the least likely to overcome
their initial mental set in order to reach a creative solution
(Ricks et al., 2007).
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Taken together, the existing literature on the role of working
memory in creative thought and behavior highlights that this topic
requires further investigation in order to gain a better understand-
ing of the cognitive underpinnings of creativity in everyday life.
The ﬁeld of sport has recently been proposed to be a suitable
context to investigate creative performance in a complex, eco-
logically valid way (Memmert, 2011). Due to the ambiguity of
ﬁndings, we chose to further the understanding on the relation-
ship between working memory and creativity by investigating this
association amongst experienced soccer players within their ﬁeld
of experience. In particular, we were interested in the question of
whether an athlete’s domain-speciﬁc creativity might be restricted
by their domain-general cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory
capacity). In order to address this question, we administered a
domain-general measure of working memory capacity (the auto-
mated operation span, Unsworth et al., 2005) in combination with
a domain-speciﬁc sport creativity task (Memmert et al., 2013).
The rationale for using the automated operation span task was
derived from the controlled attention theory of working memory
capacity (Engle, 2002, for a review) which suggests that domain-
general measures of working memory capacity predict higher
order cognition such as, e.g., language comprehension (King and
Just, 1991) or reasoning (Kyllonen and Christal, 1990), because
of the domain general controlled attention component shared
by these tasks and the working memory capacity tasks. Consis-
tent with this view, a modiﬁcation of the reading span task that
requires mathematical processing instead of comprehending sen-
tences is still an excellent predictor of language comprehension
(e.g., Engle, 2002). In working memory capacity measures partic-
ipants generally have to memorize digits or words while solving
a demanding, secondary processing task such as verifying equa-
tions. In this respect, these tasks measure the ability of individuals
to keep task-relevant information in a state of heightened activity
during the execution of a processing task. Hence, the automated
operation span task is a well-suited domain-general measure that
has proven to be suitable to predict domain-speciﬁc performance
(e.g., Furley and Memmert, 2012). This study demonstrated that
ice hockey players with a low working memory capacity failed to
adjust their tactical decisions to the demands of the game situa-
tion and more often “blindly” followed a tactical instruction they
got from the coach during a simulated time-out, even though
it was not appropriate for the game situation. Importantly, ice
hockey players with a high working memory capacity were more
proﬁcient at adjusting their tactical decision to the demands of
the situation instead of relying on the information they got dur-
ing a simulated team time-out that was not appropriate for the
following offensive game situation. No differences between high
and low working memory capacity ice-hockey players were evi-
dent in situations in which the tactical information they got in
the team time-out was helpful for the following game situation
as there was no inner conﬂict between possible solutions to be
resolved, and therefore the situation did not require attentional
control.
The rationale for choosing the creativity task of Memmert
et al. (2013) was that this task paradigm has been shown to
have good psychometric properties for measuring both diver-
gent (Johnson and Raab, 2003; Memmert, 2010a) and convergent
thinking (Memmert, 2010b). The chosen criteria for creative solu-
tions in team sport (originality, ﬂexibility, and ﬂuency) have been
derived from the state-of-the-art creativity research (Sternberg,
1999; Runco, 2007; Antonietti et al., 2013) and have successfully
been transferred to the context of sports in numerous studies (for
a review Memmert, 2013, 2015a; also Memmert and Roth, 2007;
Memmert and Perl, 2009a,b; Memmert, 2010b).
In the present study we test the hypothesis whether domain-
general working memory capacity is a restricting factor in the
creativity of soccer players. Given the outlined controversial ﬁnd-
ings on the relationship between working memory capacity and
creativity, we test this two-sided hypothesis by conducting both
null-hypothesis signiﬁcance tests, while also following recent
recommendations (Cumming, 2012, 2014) of reporting effect-




Sixty one male soccer athletes (Mage = 23.48, SD = 3.6) took
part in the study. Their average playing experience was 17.6 years
(SD = 3.9) at an amateur to semi-professional level in Germany.
The athletes reported to spend an average of 5.7 h/week (SD = 4.4)
of playing or training soccer. None of these variables signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced the pattern of results. Written informed consent was
obtained from every participant before commencing the experi-
ment. The study was carried out in accordance with the Helsinki
Declaration of 1975.
EXPERIMENTAL TASK AND MEASURES
Working Memory measure
We used the well-established automated operation span score as
an index of working memory capacity (Unsworth et al., 2005). As
in the original operation span task (Turner and Engle, 1989) par-
ticipants had to solve math problems while trying to remember
an unrelated set of letters. The task included a total of 15 trials
(three trials each with 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 letters to remember). An
example of a three-item trial might be: is (8/2) – 1 = 1? (cor-
rect/incorrect?) → F; is (6 ∗ 1) + 2 = 8? (correct/incorrect?) → P;
is (10 ∗ 2) − 5 = 15? (correct/incorrect?) → Q. After verifying the
three equations in this example, participants were asked to select
the presented letters with a mouse click from an array of 12 poten-
tial letters in the order they were presented (in this case F, P, Q).
The primary measure of working memory capacity was the Ospan
score (Unsworth et al., 2005), calculated as the total number of let-
ters recalled across all error-free trials. See Unsworth et al. (2005)
for full task details. The task lasted approximately 15 min.
Creativity task
We adapted the soccer-speciﬁc divergent-thinking test (see Mem-
mert et al., 2013, for full details) consisting of 20 different video
clips displaying offensive soccer scenes that allowed for a variety
of possible solutions when the video stopped with one offen-
sive player in possession of the ball. The test was created in
assistance with two independent soccer experts in possession of
high-level trainer certiﬁcations from a large battery of soccer
matches from 2010/2011. The ﬁnal 20 scenes that comprised the
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soccer-speciﬁc creativity test (Memmert et al., 2013)were those for
which the experts had agreed upon offering the most tactical deci-
sion options. Each scene was approximately 10 s long, after which
it was stopped and the last frame was shown for an additional
3.5 s before it faded away to a black screen. This frame showed an
attacking player in possession of the ball, with a variety of tactical
options to his disposal.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited from local football clubs and tested
individually in a quite laboratory on a standard 15 inch note-
book. After ﬁlling out a questionnaire, gathering biographic
data, participants were randomly allocated to either ﬁrst take
the automated operation span or the soccer-speciﬁc divergent
thinking test to avoid potential order effects. Altogether, testing
took approximately 50 min. E-prime 2.0 professional (Psycho-
logical Software Tools, 2007) was used to administer both the
automated operation span task and the soccer-speciﬁc divergent
thinking task. The instructions were standardized and presented
on the computer screen. For the divergent thinking task, par-
ticipants were instructed to assume the role of the player in
possession of the ball. Half of the participants viewed 10 videos
and 10 stills presented in random order, while for the other
group this was reversed and the 10 videos were presented as
stills and the 10 stills as videos. The rationale for this was to
explore the difference between dynamic and static information in
domain-speciﬁc creative problem-solving as dynamic information
is more representative of the decision making demands experi-
enced soccer-players are confronted with in their performance
environments (Helsen and Starkes, 1999; Williams and Ericsson,
2005). As no differences were evident between static and dynamic
scenes we collapsed data analysis over both categories. After every
stimulus presentation participants had to write down all the tacti-
cal decision making options that came to their mind. Participants
had 45 s time (the time was indicated by a countdown after every
stimulus presentation on the screen) to generate as many adequate
tactical solutions as possible (divergent thinking) and then bring
these generatedoptions in ahierarchical order (within the 45 s time
frame) with option one being the option that they would actually
decide upon in that situation (convergent thinking). After com-
pleting the testing procedure, participants were informed about
the purpose of the experiment.
DATA ANALYSIS
Soccer-speciﬁc divergent thinking was assessed by using the three
criteria of ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and originality (see Guilford, 1967;
Runco, 2007). Fluency was simply assessed by the number of tac-
tical solutions produced by a participant. Flexibility was measured
via diversity of responses. All solutions given by the participants
were sorted into seven different categories based on Memmert
et al. (2013: shot on goal, feint followed by a pass, dribble, short
pass, lob, cross, and miscellaneous). One point was given for each
category selected by a subject and summed for the respective stim-
ulus, before being divided by the total number of stimuli to arrive
at a ﬂexibility score for every participant. Two independent raters
(soccer experts with high-level coaching certiﬁcations) judged the
originality of the solutions for each scene. The soccer experts were
not familiar with any other variables about the participants. The
available range for the originality assessments was 1 (not original
at all) to 5 (very original). The inter-judge reliability coefﬁcient
was above the critical limit of 0.80 (intraclass correlation coefﬁ-
cient). The individual ratings of the stimuli were used to compute
a mean originality score for each participant (the ratings from
both raters were averaged for every stimulus and then summed up
before being divided by the total number of responses). Besides
analyzing the three components of divergent thinking, we fur-
ther computed a creativity value by averaging the z-transformed
ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and originality values.
Further, the same two soccer experts who rated the originality
of the responses agreed upon an optimal solution for every scene
which served as an index for the best solution participants could
have chosen. As a measure for convergent thinking we compared
the correspondence of participants’ ratings with the experts’ best
solution and summed up the number of correspondences before
dividing them by the total number of scenes.
We analyzed the relationship between working memory capac-
ity and the measures of creativity by computing Pearson’s correla-
tion coefﬁcients and corresponding conﬁdence intervals. Further
we compared the upper and lower working memory quartiles with
a series of independent t-tests (all two-tailed).
RESULTS
Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcients for the operation span and the
different measures of creativity are shown in Table 1 and their
graphical equivalent in Figure 1. The pattern of results clearly
shows no relationship between domain-general working memory
capacity and domain-speciﬁc creativity. Even when only com-
paring the 25% highest (M = 65.7, SD = 7.1) and 25% lowest
(M = 23.5, SD = 4.4; t(28) = − 19.649; p < 0.001, d = 7.1)
working memory capacity athletes—which is common practice
in the working memory capacity literature (Engle, 2002, for a
review)—no signiﬁcant differences emerged for the combined cre-
ativity value (t(28) = − 0.560; p = 0.58, d = 0.204), the ﬂuency
value [t(28) = − 0.752; p = 0.46, d = 0.275], the ﬂexibility value
[t(28) = 0.641; p = 0.53, d = 0.233], and the originality value
[t(28) = − 0.749; p = 0.46, d = 0.273].
Further, the correlation betweenworkingmemory capacity and
a measure of convergent thinking—the ﬁnal option chosen—was
not signiﬁcant (cf. Table 1), indicating that a high domain-general
workingmemory capacity is not associatedwith better decisions in
soccer. This was also evident when comparing the 25%highest and
25% lowest working memory capacity athletes [t(28) = − 0.429;
p = 0.67, d = 0.156]. This ﬁnding is in line with Furley and
Memmert (2012) who provided evidence that a higher working
memory capacity is only associated with superior decision making
in certain situations, e.g., when a predominant response tendency
interferes with the best solution in a situation or when there is
external distraction from the decisionmaking task. However, there
was no association between overall decision quality and working
memory capacity.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between
domain-general working memory capacity and domain-speciﬁc
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Table 1 | Correlations (Pearson’s r ) coefficients for working memory capacity and the creativity measures.
WMC Divergent Fluency Flexibility Originality Convergent
WMC − 0.102 0.107 −0.004 0.061 0.132
Divergent [−0.15,0.35] − 0.835** −0.821** −0.051 0.056
Fluency [−0.15,0.35] [0.74,0.89] − −0.868** −0.530** 0.105
Flexibility [−0.26,0.25] [0.72,0.89] [0.79,0.92] − −0.552** −0.034
Originality [−0.19,0.31] [−0.30,0.20] [−0.69,−0.32] [−0.71,−0.35] − 0.019
Convergent [−0.12,0.37] [−0.20,0.31] [−0.15,−0.35] [−0.28,0.22] [−0.23,0.27] −
The lower and upper bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval are shown in square brackets in the bottom left half of the table. Correlations that are signiﬁcant (α = 0.01;
two-tailed) are marked with **.
FIGURE 1 | Bivariate correlations between working memory capacity and the three divergent thinking measures (fluency, flexibility, and originality)
and working memory capacity with the convergent thinking measure.
creativity amongst experienced soccer players. The pattern of
results provides evidence that domain-general working memory
capacity was not associated with creativity in a soccer-speciﬁc cre-
ativity task. Thus, our ﬁndings do not support the previously
reported suggestion of a positive relationship between a domain-
generalmeasure of workingmemory capacity anddomain-speciﬁc
creativity (De Dreu et al., 2012). The present ﬁndings are in
line with existing studies that do not ﬁnd any direct correlation
between working memory and creativity (e.g., Takeuchi et al.,
2011; Lee and Therriault, 2013). Therefore, our results suggest
that the moderating role of the nature of the creativity task plays
an important role in the interaction between divergent thinking
and working memory, as it is evident in current creativity research
(for reviews, see Kasof, 1997). Or as Fugate et al. (2013, p. 236)
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pointed out: “In sum, the mediating effect of working memory on
creativity depends on the type of task to be performed.” In this
respect, the present ﬁndings are well aligned with current theoriz-
ing (seeWiley and Jarosz, 2012, for a review) on the role of working
memory capacity in problem solving, concluding that successful
problem solving depends on the needs of the situation.
While an increasing number of correlational studies and
laboratory-based experiments have started investigating creativity
and working memory, there are only few studies which take task
complexity and domain-speciﬁc knowledge in regard to the task
into consideration. The present research provides a ﬁrst attempt
of ﬁlling this gap in the literature. However, the present research
is not without limitations. Although, we provide evidence that
domain-general working memory capacity was not related with
domain-speciﬁc creativity amongst experienced soccer players, we
did not experimentally manipulate domain-speciﬁc experience by
either varying the task demands or the experience level of the
participants. As we were interested in answering the question
whether an athlete’s domain-speciﬁc creativity is restricted by their
domain-general cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory capac-
ity), it is currently not clear whether less experienced athletes or
children would have beneﬁtted on the creativity task from having a
greater working memory capacity. Further in consideration of the
ﬁndings of Ricks et al. (2007) who showed that expertise in com-
bination with high working memory capacity can hinder creative
performance, top-level soccer players (as compared to the amateur
to semi-professional participants) might have been inﬂuenced by
their working memory capacity on the creativity task. Therefore,
future research and theorizing on the role of working memory
in creative behavior needs to distinguish between different types
of creative performance while considering the role of domain-
speciﬁc experience in the creativity task. A fruitful approach in
this endeavor would be to manipulate task demands (requiring
domain-speciﬁc knowledge or not) while having various partici-
pant groups varying in domain-speciﬁc experience and working
memory capacity.
Given the importance of creative moments, products, and pro-
cesses in a variety of contexts, such as economy, medicine, science,
or sports, the present research contributes to a growing body of
literature that sheds light on the underlying cognitive mechanisms
associated with creative thought and behavior. Speciﬁcally, we
demonstrated that working memory capacity was not a limiting
factor on creative decision making amongst skilled performers.
Therefore, experienced soccer players did not beneﬁt from a supe-
rior working memory capacity in ﬁnding creative solutions to
soccer-speciﬁc situations. However, similar to previous research in
psychology showing that a narrow focus of attention is detrimental
to creativity (Wiley and Jarosz, 2012, for a review), studies in the
context of sports have demonstrated impaired creative problem
solving by narrowing the focus of attention via speciﬁc instruc-
tions amongst children (Memmert, 2007; Memmert and Furley,
2007) and adult athletes (Furley et al., 2010; Memmert, 2015b).
This might suggest that although individual differences in focused
attention (as measures by working memory capacity, Engle, 2002)
did not contribute to creativity, situational manipulations of avail-
able working memory capacity (e.g., taxing working memory by
a secondary task, cf. De Dreu et al., 2012, study 1) might affect
creative problem solving. Future research might want to look into
this possibility.
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